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Abstract. This paper aims to systematize and develop humanistic practice by 
considering the implications of adopting an experiential stance to working within the 
“inter-experiential” realm: the interface between one person’s experiences and those 
of another. Psychological theory and research are used to develop an understanding 
of how people perceive, and misperceive, others’ experiences, and implications for 
practice are discussed: in particular, the need to encourage clients to test out their 
assumptions about others’ experiences and to communicate more transparently their 
own. The paper then focuses on the issue of “metaperceptions” – how one person 
perceives another person as perceiving them and their experiences – and, again, 
argues that people often make significant errors in their judgments. Implications for 
practice are discussed, with a particular emphasis on using appropriate self-
disclosure to deliberately challenge clients’ metaperceptual errors. In the conclusion 
to this paper, the proposed inter-experiential practices are presented as specific 
process-experiential tasks. 
 
 
Keywords: experiential psychotherapy, phenomenological psychology, interpersonal 
perception, metaperception, interpersonal phenomenology 
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INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTIONS AND METAPERCEPTIONS: 
HUMANISTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY IN THE INTER-
EXPERIENTIAL REALM 
 
As a family of psychotherapeutic practices rooted in a commitment to deeply 
valuing and trusting others (Cooper, 2007a), the humanistic psychotherapies tend to 
give epistemological and clinical priority to the phenomenological, experienced 
aspects of human beings’ lives. Here, in contrast to positivistic, idealistic or 
psychoanalytic worldviews, human experiences are not seen as epiphenomena but as 
the very grounds of being (e.g. Gendlin, 1970): human beings are their experiences. 
Hence, to deeply understand their clients, humanistic-experiential psychotherapists 
are encouraged to avoid interpreting, analyzing or “looking behind” their clients’ 
experiences, but to help them explore the very actuality of their lived-being (e.g. 
Mahrer, 1996; Rogers, 1959).  
A critical question raised by such a psychotherapeutic approach, however, is 
that of the nature of human experiencing. What does it mean to experience something 
and what is that experiencing like? Phenomenological and humanistic theorists have 
attempted to answer this question in a number of different ways (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, 
1962; Sartre, 1958; Spinelli, 2001) and, within the field of humanistic 
psychotherapeutic practice, have tended to put particular emphasis on the individual, 
internal, subjective nature of this experiencing (e.g. Bugental, 1981; Rogers, 1959; see 
Cooper, 2007b). However, for a number of existential philosophers and 
psychotherapists, it is erroneous to assume that experiencing resides “within” us. 
Rather, theorists such as Heidegger (1962) and Merleau-Ponty (1962) have argued 
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that experiencing is fundamentally out-in-the-world-between-us: an “intersubjective” 
phenomenon (see Crossley, 1996).  
In phenomenological terms (Spinelli, 2005), such an intersubjectivity can be 
hypothesized to exist at both the “noetic” end of the experiencing pole (i.e., the 
manner or act of experiencing) and also the “noematic” end (i.e., the content of 
experiences). With respect to the former, for instance, the fact that human beings 
think through the socially-constructed medium of language means that their everyday 
experiencing is inseparable from the thoughts, feelings, histories and experiences of 
others (cf. Vygotsky, 1962). Similarly, at the other end of the experiencing pole, it is 
clear – not the least to psychotherapists – that human beings spend an inordinate 
amount of their lives dwelling on the behaviors, thoughts and feelings of others. More 
than that, though, the fact that we experience others who experience us experiencing 
them, ad infinitum, means that our experiences are fundamentally embedded within a 
complex, multi-directional “inter-experiential” web (Cooper, 2005), in which our 
“own” experiences can never be entirely disentangled from the experiences of others. 
Drawing on the work of R. D. Laing (in particular, 1969; 1966) as well as 
contemporary social psychological research, the aim of this paper is to develop an 
understanding of this inter-experiential field: how one person’s experiences relate to 
those of another. Analyses of intersubjective, relational and systemic processes are by 
no means new in psychology and psychotherapy (e.g., Johnson, 1996; Mitchell, 2000; 
Portnoy, 2008; Sullivan, 1953; Yalom, 2001), but the contribution of this present 
analysis is to try and understand such dynamics in wholly phenomenological terms: 
i.e., in terms of experiencing, intentional beings, without recourse to such non-
phenomenological concepts as “unconscious” or “systemic” processes. Such an 
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approach makes this analysis particularly relevant to a humanistic-experiential 
standpoint. In contrast to more psychodynamic perspectives, the paper also attempts 
to understand human inter-relating – and particularly problematic relating – in terms 
of “here-and-now” biases and misperceptions, as opposed to more historically- or 
pathologically-derived phenomena, such as transference.   
In addition, the paper looks at the implications of this analysis for the practice 
of experiential-humanistic psychotherapy, identifying a set of inter-experiential “task 
markers,” and proposing a set of potentially helpful responses (cf. Process-
experiential/Emotion-focused Therapy, Greenberg, Rice, & Elliott, 1993). Here, as 
with many other process-experiential tasks, the actual interventions being outlined are 
not entirely new, but this is a first attempt to systematize such forms of practice and to 
ground them in a specific body of psychological knowledge. As with all other 
process-experiential tasks, it should also be emphasized that there is no suggestion 
here that these inter-experiential interventions will be appropriate or helpful for all 
clients. Rather, by its very nature, the aim of such an analysis is to try and specify the 
particular instances or difficulties for which these inter-experiential practices may be 
of value.  
 
INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTIONS 
How does one person perceive another person’s experiences, and are those 
perceptions likely to be accurate? Laing’s (1969) starting point is that one person can 
never have a direct awareness of another person’s experiences of his or her world: 
“He cannot see through the other’s eyes and cannot hear through the other’s ears” 
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(p.28). This means that, however intuitive, empathic or psychologically-minded an 
individual may be, his or her perception of another person’s experience will always be 
dependent, at least to some extent, on that other’s public actions and characteristics, 
and these are likely to represent only a segment of how that other actually experiences 
his or her world. This is for a number of reasons: first, most human beings make 
deliberate – as well as non-conscious – efforts to manage those aspects of their 
experiencing that are seen by others (Goffman, 1971), with some experiences forever 
retained at a private level. Second, an observer only ever sees a target individual in a 
limited range of circumstances, for instance, at work and at conferences, but not at 
home or with friends. Hence, while an observer may be able to make an informed 
guess as to what another human being is experienced, this will always be based on 
incomplete data, such that the possibility of having an entirely accurate understanding 
of another’s experiences is likely to be small.  
Moreover, the fact that our perceptions of others are reliant on those others’ 
public characteristics means that the way we perceive them is likely to be biased in 
the direction of their self-presentations, and this is what psychological research 
indicates (for instance, Storms, 1973). A classic illustration of this is the way that quiz 
masters tend to be perceived as more knowledgeable than their contestants, even 
though an observer, logically, would know that they have been fed the questions and 
answers as part of their role. In other words, although, intuitively, we may have a 
sense that someone has many more sides to them than what can be seen at a public 
level, there is a marked tendency to experience others in the direction of their self-
presentation, and this seems to be because that presentation is of greater perceptual 
salience than any inferred characteristics (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 1999).  
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 Such an analysis does not deny the possibility that human beings have the 
capacity to deeply and intuitively understand the experiences of others; indeed, there 
is evidence to suggest that the capacity to empathize and to understand other minds is 
an innate human characteristic (see, Cooper, 2001). Yet it is clear from the research 
evidence, and the world around us, that a deep empathic understanding of others is not 
the usual state of human affairs: that human beings do, sometimes violently, 
misperceive others’ experiences. From a humanistic standpoint, we might want to 
argue that this is primarily a failure of actualization rather than an innate human 
characteristic; but the cognitive social psychology evidence cited above, as well as 
research into “theory of mind” and “mentalization” processes (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 
2000), suggest that the ability to conceptualize others’ experiences is not wholly in-
built. Rather, to be fully actualized, it seems to require particular kinds of cognitive, 
interpersonal and social development, as well as conscious effort and will.  
 Research from these fields also suggests that the ability to accurately 
conceptualize others’ experiences is likely to vary significantly across individuals 
(Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000); and, as with Laing (1969), Cooper (2005) and 
Interpersonal Psychotherapists (e.g. Stuart & Robertson, 2003; Sullivan, 1953; 
Weissman, Markowitz, & Klerman, 2000), difficulties in conceptualizing others’ 
experiences have been associated with various forms of psychological distress. One 
reason for this may be that an inability to understand how others’ experience their 
world can lead to difficulties in interpersonal relationships, and this has been shown to 
be a key predisposing factor for many different psychological difficulties (e.g., Brown 
& Harris, 1978; Segrin, 2001). Take the following example: Ismail, a 40 year old 
man, comes to therapy saying that he finds it difficult to relate to woman, and is 
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having particular problems with his current partner, Maureen1. He reports that 
Maureen constantly criticizes him for being insensitive and uncaring, and he cannot 
understand what she is saying, because he feels that he is really trying to be thoughtful 
and does not know what else to do. As the situation is explored, what emerges is that 
Ismail spends a lot of time away at work, and when he does come home, he tends to 
keep out of Maureen’s way because he experiences her as hostile and critical. In fact, 
when they argue, Ismail reports that Maureen talks about feeling useless and 
unwanted as a consequence of Ismail’s behavior; but from Ismail’s narrative it is clear 
that he experiences her as a powerful, overwhelming, judgmental figure, who is 
consistently focused on putting him down. Here, what is evident is that Ismail finds it 
difficult to really perceive Maureen’s vulnerabilities and insecurities, even though she 
sometimes directly discloses them to him. This, then, leads to a destructive 
interpersonal cycle: Ismail feels criticized, he withdraws, Maureen feels hurt, she 
expresses anger and Ismail withdraws further. 
 From a psychodynamic perspective, it might be hypothesized that Ismail’s 
tendency to perceive Maureen as strong and powerful – despite her expressed 
vulnerabilities – is because he projects on to her qualities from an earlier domineering 
figure in his life, such as his mother. Alternatively, it might be argued that Ismail 
experiences Maureen in this way because of his own feelings of low self-esteem. Both 
of these explanations may have some validity. What is also evident in the work, 
however, is that Ismail finds it difficult to believe that Maureen is hurt and vulnerable 
because she just seems so angry so much of the time, and the more Ismail explores 
                                                 
1 As with all case examples in this paper, details of individuals have been changed to protect 
anonymity. 
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this possibility – recognizing that underneath the anger she may actually experience a 
great deal of vulnerability – the more the vicious cycle starts to unwind.  
 
EXPLORING INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTIONS IN PRACTICE 
 What are the implications of this analysis for the practice of humanistic-
experiential psychotherapy and psychotherapy in general? First, if clients’ 
misperceptions of others’ experiences are a potent source of psychological distress, it 
would seem important for psychotherapists to have strategies to help clients reflect on 
and, if necessary, correct, their perceptions of others’ experiences. At its most basic, 
this might simply involve a psychotherapist asking their clients to articulate what they 
imagine others to be experiencing. For instance, a psychotherapist working with 
Ismail might ask: “What do you think Maureen experiences when you are away from 
home?” The point here would not be for Ismail to come up with the “right” answer or 
to take him away from his own experiencing, but to encourage him to reflect on his 
perception of Maureen’s experience, and perhaps to then go on and test his perception 
out by asking Maureen what she is actually feeling and thinking. In a sense, the aim 
here is to help clients get to a place where they can empathize more fully with others: 
where they have a more accurate understanding of how others experience their world, 
and hence are less likely to fall into misunderstandings and interpersonal conflicts. In 
other words, from an intersubjective standpoint, psychological wellbeing is not only 
associated with the experience of being empathized with (cf. Rogers, 1957, 1959) but 
also of being able to extend that empathy to others (cf. Yalom, 2001): what we might 
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call the development of “other-awareness,” a corollary to the more familiar process of 
evolving “self-awareness.” 
 Helping clients to develop other-awareness may also be an important element 
in helping them achieve a more positive sense of self-worth. As argued above, 
observers tend to perceive others in terms of their self-presentations, and because 
those self-presentations will tend to mask feelings of vulnerability, uncertainty and 
inadequacy, observers will tend towards perceiving others as more confident, capable 
and self-assured than they actually are. This, then, can have a negative impact on the 
observer’s sense of self-worth, on the grounds that, as social psychologists have 
demonstrated (e.g. Festinger, 1954), how people feel about themselves is relative to 
how they perceive others. In other words, the more that individuals perceive others as 
confident and capable, the more likely they are to see themselves as relatively 
inadequate and weak. In this respect, one might go so far as suggesting that there are 
two basic routes to a positive sense of self-worth: one is to realize one’s own strengths 
and capacities, and the other is to realize how inadequate others often feel inside 
(Cooper, 2005)!  
 In terms of therapeutic practice, this means that it also may be particularly 
helpful for psychotherapists to help clients explore possible fantasies and assumptions 
about how other people experience their world: for instance, that everyone else is 
confident, fulfilled, and feeling happy. Therapist self-disclosure can play a valuable 
role here and, as Farber (2000) and Spinelli (2001) suggest, in certain instances, it 
may be particularly valuable for psychotherapists to disclose to clients their own 
vulnerabilities and difficulties, such that clients’ assessments of their own relative 
worth may be substantially enhanced. For a client to discover, for instance, that their 
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therapist also gets depressed or feels worthless may substantially attenuate the 
secondary feelings of shame or inferiority that may have constellated around these 
primary emotions (Cooper, 2005). As with all self-disclosures (Hill & Knox, 2002), 
however, it is important to emphasize that such disclosures should only be used 
sparingly; and should not remove the focus from the client, interfere with the flow of 
the session, burden or confuse the client, be intrusive, or blur the client-therapist 
boundaries (see, Cooper, 2008).  
 If, however, interpersonal misperceptions are pathogenic because they have a 
negative impact on clients’ interpersonal (as well as intrapersonal) relationships, then 
it is not only corrections to the clients’ interpersonal perceptions that could facilitate 
the clients’ wellbeing. Equally, if those in relationship with the clients, such as 
Maureen, could be helped to perceive the clients’ experiences more accurately, then 
this could also have a positive relational, and thereby psychological, impact. Of 
course, psychotherapists working on a one-to-one basis are not able to have a direct 
impact on significant others in a client’s life, but they can help clients to express their 
experiences and wants more directly to those others, such that those others may then 
be more fully aware of what the client is experiencing and wanting. To a large extent, 
all forms of psychotherapy facilitate this process: helping clients to develop the self-
awareness and confidence to assertively express their feelings and thoughts to others; 
and, indeed, by modeling a congruent way of being (Rogers, 1957), humanistic-
experiential psychotherapists may also help clients to develop more transparent modes 
of relating. In some instances, however, it may also be helpful for psychotherapists 
simply to encourage or challenge clients to be honest with others about what they are 
feeling or thinking (a strategy sometimes advocated in Interpersonal Psychotherapy, 
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Stuart & Robertson, 2003). For example: a client complains that her husband has no 
idea how stressful it is for her to look after the children. He goes to work, comes 
home, puts his feet up, she says, and expects her to clean up for him and make his 
food when she feels she has been working just as hard all day. She is asked how she 
feels about this: “Disrespected, resentful, angry.” She is helped to explore these 
feelings, but at some point, she is also asked whether she has ever actually told her 
husband how she feels. She says that she probably has done, “Just not directly, but he 
must know what’s going.” This is explored further, and it emerges that the client has 
never really told her husband about how hard she feels she works and how hurt she 
feels about his behavior: she just feels he should know this. In response to this, the 
psychotherapist suggest that, perhaps, sometimes people are not as aware of our 
experiences as we would like them to be, and he asks her if she thinks it would be 
helpful to communicate directly to her husband about her resentment and hurt. “I 
suppose I could give it a go,” she says, “What have I got to lose?” The remainder of 
the session is spent considering how she might go about doing this. 
  
METAPERCEPTIONS 
 This analysis of human beings’ perceptions of others’ experiences leads on to 
an exploration of one very specific realm of inter-experiencing: how one person 
perceives another person’s perceptions of him or her. Laing et al (1969) referred to 
such perceptions as “metaperceptions” and argued that mismatches between 
metaperceptions and others’ actual perceptions plays a substantial role in the 
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generation of psychological distress, through the kinds of interpersonal 
misunderstandings and conflicts identified above.  
 Research in the social psychological field suggests that such mismatches are 
commonplace. Numerous studies, for instance, have found that individuals’ 
metaperceptions correlate very poorly with the others’ actual perceptions of them (see 
reviews of the empirical evidence by Kenny & Depaulo, 1993; Shrauger & 
Schoeneman, 1979), and this is particularly the case for people who have low self-
esteem (Langer & Wurf, 1999) or high social anxiety (Depaulo, Hoover, Webb, 
Kenny, & Oliver, 1987; Pozo, Carver, Wellens, & Scheier, 1991). Indeed, correlations 
between metaperceptions and others’ actual perceptions are frequently of a non-
significant nature, and nearly always less than .20 (Depaulo et al., 1987; Kenny & 
Depaulo, 1993; Malloy & Janowski, 1992; Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979). More 
specifically, what the research has demonstrated is that while people do seem to have 
some insight into how others, in general, tend to perceive them (e.g., “Most people 
see me as fairly intelligent”), they have “just a tiny glimmer of insight into how they 
are uniquely viewed by particular other people” (Kenny & Depaulo, 1993, pp.151, 
italics added). In other words, people tend to assume a greater homogeneity in how 
they are seen by others than there actually is (Cooper, 2005; Kenny & Depaulo, 
1993). 
 In terms of why people tend to be such poor judges of others’ perceptions of 
them, social psychological research has come up with one very plausible explanation: 
“people’s beliefs about how others view them are based primarily on their perceptions 
of themselves” (Kenny & Depaulo, 1993, p.154). In other words, people tend to 
assume that others see them as they see themselves, and struggle to put to one side 
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their own self-perception to see themselves “from the outside”. In a summary of the 
research evidence, for instance, Kenny and DePaulo (1993) found correlations of 
between .47 and .70 between self-perceptions and metaperceptions at the individual 
level; and, at the generalized level, between .51 and 1.00.  
 Clinically, this belief that others see us as we see ourselves – the “myth of 
self-transparency” (Depaulo et al., 1987) – has been associated with a range of 
psychological problems. Cognitive psychotherapists, for instance, have suggested that 
it is a key distortion associated with avoidant and paranoid personality types 
(Reinecke & Freeman, 2003) and Interpersonal Psychotherapists have identified it as 
a common factor in marital disputes (Stuart & Robertson, 2003). Indeed, to some 
extent, it could be argued that this metaperceptual error is a key factor in any 
interpersonal conflicts. In the example of Ismail, for instance, the problem is not just 
that he feels criticized; the problem is that he feels criticized and berated, and, at some 
level, assumes that Maureen knows how awful he feels. “Why does she go on 
criticizing me all the time?” he complains. In fact, though, what seems to be the case 
is that Maureen perceives Ismail as self-contained, confident and oblivious to her 
criticisms; and, had Ismail been aware of this metaperception, his response to her 
might have been much more conciliatory in the first place.  
 In the example of Maureen and Ismail, both parties assume that the other sees 
them as more inadequate than they actually do and, in my clinical and personal 
experience, this is nearly always the direction that metaperceptual errors take. Perhaps 
the reason for this is that, at a phenomenological level, human beings are so aware of 
their own doubts, uncertainties and vulnerabilities that it is very difficult to believe 
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that others can not see them too (again, the perceptual salience bias); yet, as argued 
above, observers are often much more influenced by an individual’s public self.  
 This assumption, that other people can see our flaws, can then do much to 
further reinforce a person’s feelings of low self-esteem. Not only do they see 
themselves as inadequate, but they believe others see them as inadequate, and this 
further compounds their sense of not being good enough. As Symbolic Interaction 
Theory suggests (Mead, 1934), how people see themselves is highly dependent on 
how they imagine others see them; but if how they imagine others see them is 
dependent on how they see themselves, it can become almost impossible to break out 
of a negative self-image. 
 
EXPLORING METAPERCEPTIONS IN PRACTICE 
If metaperceptual errors, like errors in interpersonal perceptions, are a potent source 
of psychological distress, then helping clients to reflect on, and challenge, their 
metaperceptions may be a useful therapeutic task. Here, one of the great advantages of 
the psychotherapeutic context – and, in particular, group psychotherapy – is that 
clients have an opportunity to share their metaperceptions with one or more others, 
and to find out how they are actually experienced. As a brief example: towards the 
end of a session of psychotherapy recently, a client said to me, “Well, I guess that’s it, 
me talking rubbish again, you must get so bored listening to me.” Here, my initial 
response was to ask him to expand more on what he imagined I was experiencing 
towards him, but I also very explicitly and carefully told him what my actual 
experiences were and highlighted the metaperceptual discrepancy: “You know, for the 
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last 45 minutes I’ve felt really engaged with you, and I’m really struck by how 
different this is to what you imagine I was feeling.”  
 Here, in contrast to classic transferential work, the aim was not solely to 
heighten the clients’ awareness of how he or she perceives others; nor was it simply to 
provide the client with unconditional positive regard (Rogers, 1957). Rather, it was to 
help the client really see the discrepancy between his assumption about how he was 
being experienced and how another person actually experienced him. Clinically, the 
hope is that the client may then generalize this learning out, and question his or her 
metaperceptual assumptions in other interpersonal relationships: if I, as a therapist, 
feel engaged when he assumes I am feeling bored, perhaps the same is true for other 
people: that he, for instance, is putting considerable energy into keeping other people 
entertained when, in fact, they already enjoy being with him. Such responses – 
particularly when challenging clients’ negative metaperceptual assumptions – are very 
consistent with the contemporary empirical evidence on self-disclosures (Hill & 
Knox, 2002) and feedback (Claiborn, Goodyear, & Horner, 2002), which indicate that 
positive “self-involving” statements (i.e., expressions of the therapist’s positive 
personal response to the client in the here-and-now) are particularly closely correlated 
with good outcomes (see, Cooper, 2008). 
 Of course, within the psychotherapeutic dyad, it is not just clients who may 
make metaperceptual errors. Indeed, research suggests that psychotherapists are even 
less accurate than clients at judging how they are seen by others (Michels, 2000). 
Furthermore, as with the majority of human beings, the evidence suggests that 
psychotherapists also tend to underestimate the esteem with which others hold them 
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in: assuming, for instance, that clients see them as more neurotic, and as less 
conscientious, agreeable and supportive, than they actually do (Michels, 2000).  
 Hence, as with “neurotic” countertransference (Gelso & Hayes, 2002), it 
would seem important that psychotherapists develop an awareness of any potential 
discrepancies between how they assume others perceive them and how those others 
actually do, such that these misperceptions do not cause miscommunications and 
ruptures in the therapeutic relationship. A psychotherapist, for instance, who assumes 
that others see her as weak and vulnerable, but comes across as confident and self-
assured, may be more likely to respond defensively to a client who is trying to “meet” 
her confidence than a psychotherapist who knows that others see her as powerful – 
even if she does not feel that way, herself. On training programs, one structured 
means of facilitating this self-awareness is through interpersonal perceptual exercises. 
A simple and effective version of this is to ask students to form groups of four, and 
then to spend ten to fifteen minutes completing a two by three grid, in which they are 
asked to write down how they experience each of the three other people in their 
group, and how they imagine each of those three other people experience them. Here, 
as elsewhere in this exercise, students are specifically encouraged to remain 
phenomenological in their descriptions (e.g., “I feel excited when I’m with you,” 
rather than “You are an exciting person”), to avoid making judgments, to be honest 
(within appropriate limits), and to give specific feedback rather than making bland 
generalizations. Students are then invited to spend twenty minutes with each member 
of their small group, sharing in the dyad how they imagine that that person 
experiences them and receiving feedback from that other on what that person’s actual 
experiencing of them is like. At the end of the exercise, students have an opportunity 
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to discuss this experience in their groups of four, and then in the large group, with a 
particular focus on the accuracy of their metaperceptions and any systematic biases 
that may have taken place. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, there are parallels in this inter-experiential work with working with 
transferential and countertransferential issues, but there are also some significant 
differences. First, consistent with a more humanistic-existential perspective (e.g., 
Yalom, 2001) as well as the empirical research (Hill & Knox, 2002), a rationale is 
presented for therapists going beyond, where appropriate, a “neutral stance” and 
sharing with their clients how they are actually experiencing them. Not only is this, as 
argued in this paper, an opportunity for clients to examine the accuracy of their 
perceptions and metaperceptions but if, as suggested above, people tend to 
underestimate the esteem they are afforded by others, then it can be a powerful 
opportunity for the client to receive positive, and often quite surprising, feedback. 
Second, in contrast to transferential and countertransferential work, the assumption in 
this practice is that misjudgments in the inter-experiential realm are not always due to 
unresolved issues in early childhood. Certainly, from an experiential standpoint, it is 
acknowledged that they might be; but misjudgments are also seen as emerging from 
the very nature of the here-and-now inter-experiential encounter, such that this may 
also be an appropriate area of therapeutic exploration.  
 From its non-directive beginnings (Rogers, 1942), experiential-humanistic 
psychotherapists have increasingly developed strategies and practices that can help 
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clients deepen their awareness of their experiencing (e.g. Gendlin, 1996; Greenberg et 
al., 1993; Mahrer, 1996). In process-experiential terms (Elliott, Watson, Goldman, & 
Greenberg, 2004; Greenberg et al., 1993), these strategies can be described as “tasks”, 
consisting of a task marker (“a behavioral expression of a particular experienced 
difficulty” (Elliott et al., 2004)), an intervention, and a desired end state. The inter-
experiential work being outlined here, then, can be thought of as another set of 
process-experiential tasks, which psychotherapists may introduce, spontaneously or 
deliberately, into the therapeutic exploration. From the analysis presented in this 
paper, three inter-experiential tasks, in particular, can be identified (see Table 1): 
inviting clients to explore, and test out, their assumptions about what others are 
experiencing; inviting clients to explore the possibility of communicating their wants 
to those who might be able to meet them; and challenging clients’ metaperceptual 
errors in the psychotherapeutic relationship through appropriate self-disclosure.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
As with other process-experiential tasks, such strategies may also be helpful for 
psychotherapists of other orientations. Obviously, they will not be appropriate for all 
clients, and in some cases could detract from a much-needed intrapersonal focus, but 
for clients with long-standing or acute difficulties in the interpersonal field, an 
exploration of the inter-experiential realm may be a valuable element of the 
psychotherapeutic work.  
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Table 1. Inter-experiential Tasks 
 
Task marker Intervention End state 
Implicit or explicit 
assumptions about others’ 
experiences 
Exploration of assumptions 
about others’ experiences 
and invitation to test out 
Greater understanding of others’ 
actual experiences 
Disclosure of significant 
experiences and wants that 
have not been communicate 
to those who might be able to 
meet them 
Exploration of whether it may 
be appropriate to 
communicate wants, and 
how that might be done 
Clients’ wants more fully met 
Disjunction between client’s 
metaperception of 
psychotherapist’s 
experiences and therapist’s 
actual experiences 
Clarification of 
metaperception and 
disclosure by therapist of 
actual experiences 
Greater awareness of metaperceptual 
errors 
 
 
 
 
 
